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This paper shows that obligations from debt hinder tacit collusion if equity owners are
protected by limited liability. In contrast to its advantageous commitment value in
short-run competition, leverage reduces profits from infinite interaction. Contrasting
uncorrelated shocks with a cyclical demand development, we show that in the first
case optimal pricing is anticyclical. With demand cycles, it is anticyclical only if
equity holders place a low value on future profits, but procyclical otherwise. In both
cases, the cyclicity of prices increases with the debt level. Contrary to traditional
wisdom, a lower degree of homogeneity may raise profits of leveraged firms.
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Illegal cartels are widespread in national as well as international markets. Examples
include price agreements in the paper, industrial gases, lysine, zinc phosphate and
citric acid industries in Europe. In the United States, the prosecution of price-fixing
by a graphite electrodes cartel and a vitamin cartel recently led to record fines.
However, these are only the most striking examples of price-fixing (cf. recent press
releases of the European and US antitrust authorities). Evenett, Levenstein and
Suslow (2001) survey 40 international cartels lasting on average for six years. Such
cartels are typically based on secret, implicit or explicit agreements and thus cannot
be enforced by law-suits. Earlier work singled out numerous factors alleviating or
vitiating such agreements. It showed that market conditions leading to aggressive
behavior in short-run competition, as for example a low degree of product diffe-
rentiation or flat marginal cost curves, might actually stabilize tacit agreements in
competition with infinite or unknown duration. This reversal of effects is known as
“the ‘topsy-turvy’ principle of supergame theory” (Shapiro 1989, p. 365). Although
there is a large literature on the optimal financial structure of firms, its effect on the
degree of product-market competition over short and long time spans has received
relatively little attention in the literature so far.
Outside financing of a new business area or innovation project is widespread, howe-
ver. In this case, firms choose the level of debt, e.g. the number of bonds issued,
before they decide on their strategy in the product market. There is thus a strong
dependency between firms’ decisions on financing and pricing or production levels
(quantities). Financial obligations hence can serve as a credible commitment to a
certain competitive strategy. For this reason, the capital structure of firms has recei-
ved considerable attention from industrial economists. Efforts to explain the choice
of financing by different kinds of outside capital can roughly be divided as follows:
Originating with the article of Brander , Lewis (1986), the effect of limited liability
is analyzed for different market conditions (cf. e.g., Glazer 1994, Damania 1997,
Bagliano, Dalmazzo 1999). Chevalier , Scharfstein (1995, 1996) consider its impact
in markets where consumers incur switching costs. The seminal model by Brander ,
Lewis (1986) is further developed by Showalter (1995). He showed, that the effect
of leverage in one-shot product-market competition depends on the strategic substi-
tutability or complementarity of the short-run variable: With strategic substitutes
the product-market strategy is more aggressive, whereas with strategic complements,
e.g. price competition in a homogeneous market, it is less aggressive than without
leverage. Wanzenried (2003) demonstrates that these results also obtain if goods
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are differentiated. Another stream of the literature starting with Brander , Lewis
(1988), analyzes bankruptcy cost as a factor determining the degree of competition
in the output market. Moreover, a concentrated banking sector acting as a common
lender is shown to internalize and thus lessen the procompetitive effects of leverage
resulting for some market conditions (Poitevin 1989, Bhattacharya, Chiesa 1995).
Furthermore, increased leverage can serve as a shield against a hostile takeover (Das-
gupta, Titman 1998). But there are negative effects of leverage too: A higher debt
level reduces managers opportunities to increase their personal power by acquisitions
(Zwiebel 1996). High indebtedness also reduces the trust of consumers and business
partners in the solidity of the firm (Maksimovic, Titman 1991). Two-stage models,
as for example Brander , Lewis’s (1986), are strictly valid only if firms compete only
once. Supergames, in contrast, are models of competition with infinite or unknown
duration. Maksimovic (1988) analyzes infinitely repeated competition and derives
the effect of debt on firms’ optimal output strategy in a market with constant de-
mand. Stenbacka (1994) also analyzes a supergame. He restricts attention to the
case of a homogeneous good, but allows for stochastic shocks on the demand level.
Both authors conclude that debt lowers firms’ incentive to participate in a collusive
agreement and hence leaves them worse off. All these articles treat demand fluctua-
tions in the simplest possible fashion, that is, as subject to independently, identically
distributed shocks or neglect them altogether.
Our paper shows that debt destabilizes such price-fixing conspiracies. As Rotemberg,
Saloner (1986), Haltiwanger , Harrington (1991) and Bagwell , Staiger (1997) among
others have shown, the pattern of demand changes plays an important role in deter-
mining the inclination of firms to collude. Therefore, we contrast different demand
patterns and show how leverage and demand changes jointly determine firms’ opti-
mal collusive pricing strategy. We show that leverage is advantageous in short-run
competition, but lowers firms’ profits in long-run interaction, irrespective of the de-
mand fluctuations. As is well known, greater homogeneity of products lowers profits
in one-shot competition, but alleviates tacit collusion. In extension of earlier work,
we consider a heterogeneous good and demonstrate that, in this case, a low degree
of product differentiation destabilizes collusion amongst leveraged firms.
To this end, we first consider the simpler case of stochastic fluctuations as introdu-
ced by Rotemberg, Saloner (1986). The effects of outside finance are shown in the
setup of Stenbacka (1994), generalized to account for product differentiation. Martin
(2002), p. 321 conjectures, that “...the logic behind their argument [Rotemberg’s and
Saloner’s (1986)] seems likely to carry through in a price-setting model with product
differentiation.” Here, we show that his supposition is true and continues to hold if
3
firms are leveraged.1 The future development of demand can often be predicted quite
well, however. This is especially true if it exhibits a recurring pattern. The demand
for many goods, as for example sporting equipment, transport, and fuel oil, follows
such a cyclical path. Hence, as an alternative to uncorrelated demand shocks consi-
dered first, we secondly analyze the impact of debt in a market with demand cycles.
For that purpose, we introduce leverage in the model by Haltiwanger , Harrington
(1991) and again extend it to the case of a differentiated good.
The development of demand determines equity holders’ optimal collusive strategies.
With stochastic shocks, pricing is anticyclical. If demand develops in recurring cycles,
owners of firms set prices anticyclically only if they do not place high value on future
profits. Otherwise, prices follow the cycle. Thus, the basic insights of Rotemberg,
Saloner (1986) and Haltiwanger , Harrington (1991) continue to hold if products
are differentiated and firms are leveraged. Indebtedness, however, is shown to in-
crease the competitive pressure in long run competition. This finding is opposed
to Wanzenried (2003)’s conclusion that leverage can be used to commit to a softer
behavior in the product market. Comparison of both results highlights the fact that
in dynamic competition, due to the limited liability of equity holders, repayment
obligations reduce the profit stream from collusion if firms are made bankrupt by
punishment. Hence, a higher debt level unambiguously reduces the gain from long
run competition. Firms are insolvent in non-cooperative price competition only if
products are fairly homogeneous. Contrary to the effect of product differentiation on
infinite competition amongst internally financed firms, a low degree of differentiation
destabilizes collusion of leveraged firms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the basic
assumptions. In sections 3 and 4 we derive the optimal collusive pricing strategy in
markets with uncorrelated stochastic and cyclical demand development, respectively.
As an extension, we discuss additional stochastic shocks during the demand cycle
(section 5). Section 6 summarizes the results.
2 Basic Market Conditions
Our aim is to isolate the impact of the financial structure on product-market com-
petition. To this effect, we assume that firms have to issue bonds to finance a fixed
investment in order to enter the market. Alternatively, this investment may become
1 To the best of our knowledge, the framework of Rotemberg , Saloner (1986) was never generalized
to the case of product differentiation before.
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necessary due to technological progress, as firms may have to adopt a new technology
in order to stay competitive.
We consider a market with n firms producing a differentiated, substitutive good with
equal, constant marginal costs c. The pricing behavior of these firms is perfectly
observable by all market participants. δ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the common discount
factor. Demand is continuous, bounded from above, and falling in the price of a
firm pi. i is the index for a given firm, −i the index for its rivals. θt is a parameter
determining the demand level in period t. The demand for the variety i in period t
Di(p, θt) increases continuously in the realization of θt. The current demand level
is known at the beginning of each period before prices are set. The profit functions
are concave and twice continuously differentiable.
Before competition in the product market begins, each firm issues obligations to
raise the amount bi/r = bi δ / (1 − δ) to finance the investment. In return, firms
have to repay bi every period to the holders of these bonds. For ease of exposition,
it is assumed that the need for outside funds bi/r is identical for all firms. We thus
drop the firm index on b. On the one hand, this is plausible as firms are symmetric
in every respect. On the other hand, if the debt levels were different, arguments
analogous to those given below would apply. The only difference would be that in
absence of side payments, the firm with the highest indebtedness would determine the
maximal collusive prices which do not destabilize the implicit agreement. To abstain
from transfer payments is sensible as these leave a “paper trail” and thus increase
the risk of detection. As obligations are issued and sold in the capital markets, the
liabilities of each firm are common knowledge.2 As lenders are rational, they will
not buy corporate bonds worth more than the discounted profit stream attainable in
equilibrium.
After firms have issued bonds and invested, they compete in the product market
over an infinite time horizon. Payments to bondholders b are due every period. The
residual profit is distributed equally amongst equity holders as dividends. Firms
are run by equity holders as long as they remain solvent.3 If a firm is insolvent,
2 Katz (1991) and Bagwell (1995) show that perfect observability is an indispensable condition for
contracts to serve as a credible commitment. Bond issues are indeed perfectly observable, so that
firms can credibly commit to a competitive strategy by taking up the corresponding amount of
capital in the market.
3 In some cases, control of the bank over the management of the firm may be a condition for the
provision of capital funds. Debtholders choose the product-market strategy then. This seems
to apply only to a small number of financial contracts. Thus, we exclude this possibility in our
analysis. Brander , Lewis (1986) discuss the strategic effect of debt in such a situation in a two-
stage model. They show for Cournot competition that the effect of more aggressive behavior with
outside finance is the same regardless of who controls the firm.
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debtholders become claimants of current and future profits, whereas equity holders
lose everything. Bankruptcy costs are excluded here (cf. Brander , Lewis (1988) for
an analysis in a two-stage model).
Thus, the owners in charge of each firm aim to maximize its equity value. As is well
known, firms have an incentive to alleviate competition by tacitly agreeing on higher
prices if they face the same rivals in the market over a long time span. In this case,
they maximize joint profits by setting the highest possible collusive prices. The value
of the firm for holders of its equity is therefore equal to the discounted future profit
stream in all periods, in which the firm is solvent. If a firm cheats on the implicit
agreement unilaterally choosing a lower price, its rivals set the competitive price as
a punishment from the following period on. Defection is thus rational only if the
equity value of the firm from deviation exceeds the value resulting from continued
participation in collusion. If firms are driven into insolvency by price competition,
debtholders take control of the firms. The new owners write off their debt and receive
shares of profit instead. After such a change of ownership due to bankruptcy in the
punishment phase, lenders running the firms cannot regain the trust of their rivals.
Thus, they are forced to compete in prices.4
As the following analysis shows, equity holders can influence the incentive to cheat
on an implicit agreement by issuing debt. The influence of demand changes on the
collusive strategy of equity holders is derived in section 3 for uncorrelated stochastic
shocks and in section 4 for cyclical fluctuations.
3 Stochastic Demand Shocks
Our aim is to analyze whether firms can use debt strategically to soften product-
market competition when market demand fluctuates. First, we analyze outside fi-
nance in markets where demand changes stochastically.5 To analyze the impact of
uncorrelated demand shocks we generalize the model proposed by Stenbacka (1994)
to the case of a differentiated good. If limited liability of equity holders is irrelevant,
4 Alternatively, we could assume, that lenders running the firms start competition in a collusive
equilibrium. Then, our analysis would also apply as long as firms are solvent. The same conside-
rations could be used to derive the pricing strategy of lenders in charge of the firms. In this case,
repayments have to be set to zero.
5 This model can easily be reinterpreted to cover fluctuating production costs: In this case, θt is a
parameter determining the per-period level of marginal cost ct, while demand is stable over time.
Then, a critical realization of marginal costs ĉ would result, with lower levels inducing anticyclical
pricing.
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i.e. if firms are never bankrupt, debt has no effect on firms’ inclination to collude in
the product market. Therefore, the degree of product differentiation is decisive for
the solvency of firms in the punishment phase. Stenbacka’s (1994) assumption that
firms produce a homogeneous good is indeed restrictive.
We follow Rotemberg, Saloner (1986) and assume that in every period the demand
level is subject to an identically, independently distributed stochastic shock θt ∈ [θ, θ̄].
Realizations of the shock θt are distributed according to the density function f(θt)
with the cumulative distribution function F (θt). The per-period profits of a firm
given the demand level resulting from the shock realization θt, are π
K̄(pK̄, θt) and
πK(pK, θt) for perfect and imperfect collusion, respectively. If an owner of a firm
deviates from the tacit agreement he earns πA(pA, θt). In the ensuing punishment
phase, however, firms compete in prices and attain profits πB(pB, θt) in every period.
Perfect collusion is possible between leveraged firms irrespective of whether they are
bankrupt in the punishment phase or not, if demand is stable at the lowest level
Di(p, θ), but impossible for the highest realization Di(p, θ̄) even if firms do not
issue debt. Equityholders abide by an implicit agreement if the resulting discounted
stream of additional future profits is higher than that from deviation. Thus, these

















πK̄(pK̄ , θ) f(θ)dθ < πA(pAi ,p
K̄
−i, θ̄) − π
K(pK̄, θ̄). (2)
The left hand sides show the additional profits from continued collusion, the right
hand sides the additional gain from defection. All other market conditions are as
described in section 2. As perfect collusion is stable for the lowest realization of the
shock, but not for the highest, there is a critical level of the shock θ̂ in the interval
[θ, θ̄] up to which perfect collusion is stable, but above which firms have to reduce
prices and thus profits in order to reduce the incentive to deviate from the tacit
agreement. This anticyclicity of prices arising from demand uncertainty is the basic
finding of Rotemberg, Saloner (1986). As shown below, it also holds if the good is
horizontally differentiated.
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Case 1: Firms are Solvent during the Punishment Phase
Consider first a situation where firms are solvent in the case of punishment. Under
such circumstances, equity holders never lose control of the firms. They take part
in a joint monopolization of the market if the corresponding profits are higher than






πK̄(pK̄ , θ) f(θ)dθ +
[
1 − F (θ̂)
]
















πK̄(pK̄, θt) − b
]
. (3)
The first term in square brackets on the left hand side contains the future profit
stream from the tacit agreement, the second term the future profit stream accruing
during the punishment phase. Thus, the left hand side gives the additional profits
from continued collusion, whereas the right hand side gives the additional gain from
deviation in the current period t. Observe, that the latter increases with the current
demand realization, whereas the former is independent of θt due to the assumption
of identically, independently distributed shocks. For high values of market demand,
firms are forced to reduce the incentive to deviate by setting a lower collusive price.
This is the effect of anticyclical pricing derived by Rotemberg, Saloner (1986) for
a homogeneous good. The per-period obligation to pay b cancels out: If firms are
solvent in the punishment phase, leverage has no effect on firms’ incentive to collude
but lowers its equity value, i.e. per-period profits. Thus, it is optimal to finance
investments by using internal funds.
As in the original model of Rotemberg, Saloner (1986) for homogeneous goods, there
is a critical level of shock θ̂ up to which equity holders can jointly monopolize the
market. For higher demand realizations firms set prices anticyclically. To see this,







πK̄(pK̄, θ) f(θ)dθ +
[










−i, θt) + π
K̄(pK̄, θt). (4)
Note, that b <
∫ θ̄
θ
πB(pB, θ) f(θ)dθ if firms are always solvent. The additional gain
from continued collusion net the potential additional profit from defection V (θt),
strictly decreases with the realization of the shock θt, i.e. V
′(θt) < 0: The first part
containing the expected future profit streams from collusion and price competition
is independent of the shock level. This follows from the assumption that shock
8
realizations are independently, identically distributed. With such shocks, the demand
realization today contains no information about demand in future periods. The
additional gain from cheating, πA(pAi ,p
K̄
−i, θt) − π
K̄(p, θt), increases in the current
shock realization θt as long as the profits from deviation increase more than those
from collusion with respect to the demand level.6 Hence, there is a unique value
θ̂ ∈ (θ, θ̄) fulfilling V (θ̂) = 0. We assumed that perfect collusion is stable for the









−i, θ) + π
K̄(pK̄, θ) > 0.







πK̄(pK̄ , θ) f(θ)dθ +
[










−i, θ̄) + π
K̄(pK̄, θ̄) < 0.
As V (θ) > 0 and V (θ̄) < 0 hold and the incentive to collude strictly decreases in
the demand realization V ′(θt) < 0 there is indeed a single realization of the shock
θ̂ ∈ (θ, θ̄) such that the gain from cheating is just offset by the profit stream resulting
from collusion V (θ̂) = 0. Without bankruptcy, the stability condition (3) remains
unchanged by the repayment b. Hence, the critical shock realization for stable perfect
collusion θ̂ also remains unchanged by debt. The extent to which firms are forced to
reduce collusive prices to stabilize their implicit agreement is the same for leveraged
and unleveraged firms if the former are always solvent. The amplitude of prices is
hence identical, too.
Case 2: Firms are Bankrupt in the Case of Punishment
The simplest case where firms are driven to bankruptcy by punishment is price
competition with a homogeneous good considered by Stenbacka (1994). But due to
a low degree of product differentiation, profits from price competition could also be
insufficient to meet the obligations to repay the debt. This is the case if per-period
profits from competition are insufficient to meet the financial obligations even for the
highest demand realization, i.e. b > πB(pB, θ̄) holds. In contrast to the previously
6 In a linear model with additive or multiplicative demand shocks, the slope of the profit from
deviation with respect to the demand realization is strictly larger than that of the per-period
collusive profit.
9
investigated situation, debt in these cases changes the condition for a stable implicit







πK̄(pK̄ , θ) f(θ)dθ +
[
1 − F (θ̂b)
]




−i, θt) + π
K̄(pK̄ , θt), (5)
with index b as a shorthand for bankruptcy. As producers earn zero profits from
price competition due to low differentiation and / or high indebtedness, there are
no profits in the punishment phase. Firms are therefore insolvent and debtholders
take charge of the firms.7 Repayments are due if equity holders collude or deviate,
but due to limited liability owners are free from financial obligations if firms are
bankrupt in the punishment phase. Only the profit stream from collusion is reduced
by the repayments, whereas it nets out in the additional gain from deviation. Hence,
the tacit agreement is destabilized by increased reliance on outside funds. Ceteris
paribus, the critical level of the demand realization up to which perfect collusion is
stable is lower with than without leverage.
To prove this, we first show that there is again a unique realization of the demand
shock where gains are identical whether equity holders abide by the tacit agreement
or cheat. Then, we argue that this critical realization is indeed lower if firms are
driven to bankruptcy by a breakdown of their implicit agreement. The incentive to
collude is now independent of profits in the punishment phase. As equity holders
are protected by limited liability, they have to consider the reduction of per-period
profits from collusion due to the repayments. Existence of a single value of the
demand shock θ̂b ∈ (θ, θ̄) leaving equity holders indifferent between collusion and
deviation if bankruptcy occurs during the punishment phase, V b(θ̂b) = 0, can be
shown analogously to the existence of θ̂ before. By (1) we still have perfect collusion
if demand is constant at its lowest level V b(θ) > 0. Inequality (2) shows that joint
monopolization of the market is impossible if demand is currently at the highest level,
V b(θ̄) < 0. But in the case of bankruptcy the additional gain from collusion is lower as
per-period profits are now reduced by the repayment and not by the lower per-period
profit from price competition. Thus, for all demand realizations it is more difficult to
stabilize the tacit agreement. For all demand levels the incentive to collude is smaller
7 Note that equity holders anticipate the insolvency in the period after deviation. As they receive
zero profits anyway, they are indifferent between the Bertrand-Nash price and all lower prices.
For the argument given above, however, it is sufficient that equity holders receive nothing in
this period. The exact value of the equilibrium price in the period of deviation is not decisive.
Maksimovic (1988), p. 393 gives an analogous reasoning for quantity competition and stable
demand.
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than in the case of solvency in the punishment phase. Hence, we have V b(θ) <
V (θ) and V b(θ̄) < V (θ̄). Again, the future additional profit stream from collusion
is unaffected by the current demand level if shock realizations are stochastically
independent. The incentive to collude V (θt) is changed by a variation in the demand
level only by its effect on the additional gain from cheating. The latter is the same
regardless whether firms are made bankrupt by punishment or not. Hence, the slope
must also be identical in both cases, V b
′
(θt) = V
′(θt). With 0 < V
b(θ) < V (θ),
0 > V (θ̄) > V b(θ̄) and V b
′
(θt) = V
′(θt) as shown, the shock realization leaving
equity holders indifferent between collusion and defection is indeed lower if firms
are insolvent in the punishment phase. θ̂b < θ̂ holds, as claimed above. If the
good is differentiated, but firms nevertheless are made bankrupt by a breakdown
of collusion, the conclusion reached by Stenbacka (1994) for a homogeneous good
continues to apply.
As is well known, the firms’ profits are higher the greater the degree of horizontal
product differentiation (cf. Martin 2002, p. 59 and 63). Thus, the condition for
bankruptcy in the punishment phase πB(pB, θt) ≤ b leading to the different cases
discussed above, translates to a critical degree of differentiation where the profits
from price competition are just sufficient to meet the obligations from outside fi-
nance. There is a critical level of substitutability up to which firms are driven into
bankruptcy, if punishment sets in. But if firms are solvent when facing price com-
petition, higher substitutability leads to a higher punishment. Then, collusion is
more stable, if products are less differentiated.8 Hence, the degree of product dif-
ferentiation has two opposite effects on the stability of collusion between leveraged
firms. Moreover, the impact of debt on the intensity of competition in the market is
non-monotonous in that parameter. This effect is not captured by the model for a
homogeneous good by Stenbacka (1994).
8 With a linear demand function Di(p) = θt − bpi + d
∑n
i,i6=j pj the slope of the critical thre-
shold of the discount factor for stable perfect collusion in price competition δK̄ is ∂ δK̄/∂ d =
{4bd(n− 1)2 [2b− d(n− 1)]}/[8b2− 8bd(n− 1) + d2(n− 1)2)]2. As long as the effect of a change in
a firm’s price on demand is higher than the effect a of change in rivals’ prices, 2b − d(n − 1) > 0
is true. Thus, for substitutive goods, this threshold is increasing in the degree of differentiation
d. Collusion is indeed facilitated by greater homogeneity of products as claimed above.
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Case 3: Firms are Made Bankrupt by Punishment Only if
Demand is Very Low
Suppose the profits from price competition are smaller than the repayment only if
the demand level is lower than a certain critical level Di(p
B, θ∗). Then, firms are
driven into insolvency by punishment and ownership of the firm changes only with
some probability.9 As long as the shock realizations are higher than the critical
value θ∗, firms are solvent and equity holders stay in charge of the firm even after
a deviation from the tacit agreement. In this case, denoted by the index p, equity







πK̄(pK̄, θ) f(θ)dθ +
[
1 − F (θ̂p)
]










πB(pB) f(θ) dθ − b
]
S − πA(pAi ,p
K̄
−i, θt) + π
K̄(pK̄, θt). (6)
S is an indicator function, that takes the value 1 until θt < θ
∗ holds for the first
time and 0 thereafter. If firms are solvent, the repayment is due irrespective of the
firms’ decision to abide by the implicit agreement or to violate it. As the second
term in (6) shows, for demand levels higher than Di(p
B, θ∗), the profit stream from
collusion is reduced by the per-period profits from price competition. If, however,
current demand is lower, firms are forced into bankruptcy and ownership changes.
For such realizations, financial obligations reduce the profits from collusion. As for
such low demand levels the repayment is higher than the per-period profit from price
competition, the reduction of the collusive profit stream is greater here compared to
situations where firms are solvent in the punishment phase. By the same argument,
the reduction is lower than if bankruptcy occurs after defection regardless of the
demand realization, V (θt) > V
p(θt) > V
b(θt). This is true for all demand realizations
θt ∈ [θ, θ̄]. Thus, the respective incentives to collude are higher the lower the shock
realization inducing insolvency in the punishment phase is. By (1) and (2), perfect
collusion is still stable if demand is constant at its lowest level but not if the current
demand is determined by the highest possible realization. Hence, the inequalities
0 < V b(θ) < V p(θ) < V (θ) and 0 > V (θ̄) > V p(θ̄) > V b(θ̄) hold. The additional gain
from defection is not changed by firms’ bankruptcy in the punishment phase. Again,
the additional future profits from collusion are independent of the present demand
9 Note that case 3 contains the results of cases 1 and 2 as special cases. Case 1 results, if the critical
demand level for solvency in price competition θ∗ is lower than the smallest possible realization
of the shock θ, whereas case 2 results, if θ∗ is larger than θ̄, the upper bound of the support of
the distribution function of the shock realization.
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realization. Thus, limited liability has no effect on the slope of the incentive to
collude, V p ′(θt) = V
b ′(θt) = V
′(θt). If firms are bankrupt in the punishment phase
only if the demand realization is low, the critical threshold for indifference between
collusion and deviation θ̂p lies between the value corresponding to situations where
firms are always solvent or bankrupt after defection, i.e. θ̂ > θ̂p > θ̂b. This shows,
that the anticyclicity of pricing is higher in this case than if firms were always solvent,
but lower than if they are bankrupt due to punishment for all demand realizations.
Again, the critical realization of the shock θ∗ where firms are still solvent in price
competition is lower the greater the degree of product differentiation. As firms are
less likely to be bankrupt then, the stability of collusion and hence the critical value
of the demand realization where equity holders are indifferent between collusion and
deviation is rising in the degree of heterogeneity. In contrast to traditional results
for infinitely repeated competition between unleveraged firms (cf. e.g. Shapiro 1989,
p. 365), a greater degree of product differentiation can facilitate collusion if firms are
indebted.
If market prices are lower than those resulting from perfect collusion, this is not
necessarily a sign that there is no tacit agreement. Alternatively, firms could be
hindered to attain the maximal degree of collusion by unfavorable shocks on demand
as well as by the need for outside funds.
If demand is stable at some level Di(p, θ), θ = const., θ ∈ [θ, θ̄], the stability
condition (3) simplifies. Solving the resulting inequality for the discount factor, we
obtain the reduced stability condition
δ > δK̄ =
πA(pAi ,p−i) − π
K̄(pK̄)
πA(pAi ,p−i) − max{π
B(pB), b}
, (7)
where δK̄ is the critical threshold leaving firms indifferent between collusion and
deviation. Thus, as long as firms are solvent in price competition, b < πB(pB),
equity holders’ inclination to collude is again independent of the debt level. In this
case, repayments are due, irrespective of whether firms compete, collude or deviate.
If, however, firms are bankrupt due to punishment, the critical value of the discount
factor increases with rising repayments b. If equity holders value future profits higher
than indicated by this threshold, perfect collusion is stable. Then, the maximal
repayment which does not destabilize the agreement on joint monopolization of the
market, is the amount b̄ fulfilling the stability condition (7) with equality. If equity
holders are less patient (δ < δK̄), collusion is more constrained the higher the debt
level is. In this case, owners of firms reduce prices to stabilize the tacit agreement.
In contrast to markets with stochastic shocks, these price reductions do not vary
over time. Hence, the above model with stochastic shocks contains the results of
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Maksimovic (1988) as a special case, where the support of the distribution function
of the shock realization is reduced to a single value.
Thus, with stochastic shocks, outside finance has the same effect on product-market
competition as in a market with a constant demand level. In sum, our extension of
Maksimovic (1988) and Stenbacka (1994) shows that an increase in the debt level
leads to more aggressive competition if producers of a heterogeneous good compete
over an infinite horizon in a market where demand is subject to identically, inde-
pendently distributed stochastic shocks. The equity value in the case of collusion is
reduced by debt, both as the payment b rises and as the interval of demand levels
allowing for perfect collusion [θ, θ̂p] is smaller. Equityholders have to reduce prices
for lower demand levels to keep the implicit agreement stable: The anticyclicity of
pricing is stronger due to limited liability of equity holders. Firms cannot gain a
competitive advantage by issuing debt. On the contrary, collusion is destabilized by
leverage.
In this respect the result is contradictory to the findings of Showalter (1995) and
Wanzenried (2003). They show that leverage is beneficial for firms competing in
one-shot price competition. Then, equity holders can credibly commit to a less
aggressive product-market strategy by issuing bonds. The profits from price com-
petition are thus higher. If, however, competition continues infinitely or ends at an
unknown date in the future, leverage is disadvantageous: Equity holders running the
firms decide on whether to adhere to or defect from a tacit agreement comparing
the profit streams resulting in both cases. Whenever firms are insolvent in non-
cooperative price competition, they cannot meet the repayments in the punishment
phase. In this case, obligations from debt do not cancel in the comparison of profits
from continued collusion against those from defection and the ensuing punishment.
Thus, the potential costs of cheating, i.e. the forgone future profits from the tacit
agreement, are lower the higher the repayment is. Hence, leverage rises the com-
petitive pressure in dynamic competition, exactly opposite to its effect in the short
run.
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4 Cyclical Demand Fluctuations
In this section we demonstrate that debt also increases the intensity of long run
competition if market demand develops in recurring cycles.
Demand for many commodities and services is subject to cyclical changes. Replace-
ment of equipment is cyclical in various industries. Moreover, there is a large number
of products from heating oil and sporting equipment to sugar for canning that are
subject to seasonal fluctuations. In the basic model of repeated competition with
cyclical development of demand developed by Haltiwanger , Harrington (1991), the
demand pattern is assumed to be known in advance by all market participants.
As firms producing such goods can often quite accurately forecast future demand
levels, this is a reasonable assumption for many markets. As the degree of product
differentiation proved decisive for the effect of outside finance on product-market
competition, we generalize Haltiwanger , Harrington (1991)’s model for the case of a
differentiated good and consider the possibility of outside finance in that setup.
The demand level in period t is determined by the parameter θt.
10 Over the cycle of





















θ1 for t = 1, t̄ + 1, 2t̄ + 1, 3t̄ + 1, ...
θ2 for t = 2, t̄ + 2, 2t̄ + 2, 3t̄ + 2, ...
: :
θt̂ for t = t̂, t̄ + t̂, 2t̄ + t̂, ...
: :
θt̄ for t = t̄, 2t̄, 3t̄, ...
with θ1 < θ2 < ... < θt̂ > ... > θt̄−1 > θt̄. (8)
Thus, the demand level increases from period 1 until the peak of a cycle in t̂ and falls
afterwards until it reaches the initial level again in period t̄ + 1. This single peaked
cycle is repeated infinitely over time (see figure 1).11
Constant demand considered by Maksimovic (1988) is also contained in this model.
It results as a special case if the demand parameter is constant over the cycle, θt =
const. ∀ t = 1, ..., t̄.
10 Again, this version can easily be reinterpreted to cover fluctuating production costs: In this case
θt is a parameter determining the per period level of marginal cost ct, while demand is stable
over time. If marginal costs decrease in θt, the same pattern of per-period profits results, whether
θt changes the demand level or marginal cost. As it is this cyclicity of profits that changes the
incentive to collude over time, the results derived below hold both for cyclical demand and cost
development.
11 Demand levels are discrete here. The solid line is included as it emphasizes the cyclicity of the
demand development.
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t̄ t̂ + t̄ 2t̄-
boomboom recessionrecession
The ability to collude depends on the discounted profit stream from an indefinitely
repeated cycle starting in the current period t. To shorten notation we drop the
arguments of the profit function and define
K̄(t, δ) ≡ (πK̄t + δπ
K̄
t+1 + ... + δ
t̄−tπK̄t̄ + δ
t̄−t+1πK̄1 + ... + δ
t̄−1πK̄t−1)/(1 − δ
t̄) (9)
as the discounted profits from perfect collusion starting in t when the discount factor
is given by δ, whereas
K(t, δ) ≡ (πKt + δπ
K
t+1 + ... + δ
t̄−tπKt̄ + δ
t̄−t+1πK1 + ... + δ
t̄−1πKt−1)/(1 − δ
t̄), (10)
B(t, δ) ≡ (πBt + δπ
B
t+1 + ... + δ
t̄−tπBt̄ + δ
t̄−t+1πB1 + ... + δ
t̄−1πBt−1)/(1 − δ
t̄) (11)
are the analogous profit streams from any stable implicit agreement or from unres-
trained price competition, respectively.12 Note, that the above profit streams are
gross per-period obligations, where the financial obligations of firms are not taken
into account.
If a tacit agreement to set prices above the competitive level pBt is stable, firms
can set every price in the interval [pBt ,p
K
t ] in a collusive equilibrium in period t.
As before, we assume that they implicitly agree on the highest possible price to
maximize the gain from the tacit agreement. Thus, they set prices that fulfill the
stability condition (12) with equality and thus exhaust the scope of collusion. The
resulting path of maximal collusive prices is denoted by {pKτ }
∞
τ=0.
As we will see, equity holders reduce prices in some periods of the cycle to offset the
incentive to deviate resulting from high demand. The implicit agreement is there-
fore always stable. Punishment is thus only a threat and is never actually used in
12 Note that multiplication with 1/(1− δ t̄) correctly discounts the profits from an infinitely repeated













2πK̄t+2 + ... + δ
t̄−tπK̄
t̄
+ δ t̄−t+1πK̄1 + ... + δ
t̄−1πK̄t−1).
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equilibrium. Investors in the capital market buy corporate bonds only if firms’ profits
are large enough to serve the resulting financial obligations. The resulting repayments
are therefore not higher than the smallest per-period profits attainable in equilibrium.
Profits from price competition are still lower than those from constrained collusion,
so that firms can be forced into bankruptcy by punishment if they issue the maximal
number of bonds. Let us again consider the different cases concerning the insolvency
of firms in the punishment phase in turn.
Case 1: Firms are Solvent during the Punishment Phase
To analyze the effect of demand cycles on the pricing strategy of leveraged firms,
consider first the case where firms are always solvent in the punishment phase. Then,
the amount b has to be paid in every period irrespective of whether firms violate
the implicit agreement or not. Hence, the repayment has no influence on equity
holders’ incentive to collude. The pricing strategy of leveraged and unleveraged
firms is thus identical. We present this strategy using the framework of Haltiwanger ,
Harrington (1991), extended to account for product differentiation. As we will see,
their reasoning continues to apply if goods are heterogeneous and firms are always
solvent.
As in the case of uncorrelated demand shocks, leverage does not change firms’ optimal
collusive strategy if punishment does not lead to bankruptcy. Hence, the results de-
rived by Haltiwanger , Harrington (1991) also hold if firms are leveraged and produce
a differentiated good.
The condition for stable collusion in all periods of the cycle is given by








, ∀ t. (12)
It shows that the additional future gains from collusion (left hand side) must be
higher than the additional per-period profits attainable by defection (right hand
side). With cyclical demand development, the future discounted profit streams as
well as the gain from defection depend on the starting period. Thus, the critical
value of the discount factor fulfilling this condition with equality also varies with
that period. To analyze the price strategy, we define the incentive to collude in
period t if the discount factor takes the value δ as
V (t, πK1 , ..., π
K





If the implicit agreement is stable, condition (12) and V (t, πK1 , ..., π
K
t̄ , δ) ≥ 0 hold.
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Perfect Collusion
Equityholders’ incentive to participate in perfect collusion is given as the difference
of the additional profits attainable if they abide by or violate this implicit agreement.
V (t, πK̄1 , ..., π
K̄
t̄ , δ) ≡ δ
[
K̄(t + 1, δ) −B(t + 1, δ)
]
− πAt + π
K̄
t . (14)
If it is positive, perfect collusion is stable in all periods of the cycle. The price path
is therefore {pK̄τ}
∞
τ=0. The additional gain from collusion (right hand side of (12))
increases with δ ∈ [0, 1], whereas the additional gain from deviation (left hand side)
remains constant. Depending on the position of the actual period t in the cycle,
equity holders attain different discounted profit streams per cycle. For a discount
factor at or above the critical value δK̄t , owners of firms have an incentive to partici-
pate in perfect collusion, i.e. V (t, πK̄1 , ..., π
K̄





exactly follows the movement of demand and the price develops procyclically.
If the demand is stable at the highest level, the maximal per-period profit πK̄
t̂
can





























). Due to the cyclical demand development, this maximal
profit πK̄
t̂
is not attained in all periods. Hence, the discounted future profit stream
from collusion is lower with cyclical demand than with demand stable at the highest
level. Even if competition starts at the peak of the cycle in period t̂, the incentive to
collude given by (14) is negative for δt̂. The lower bound of the discount factor for
perfect collusion is situated above the critical value for a market without a cyclical
demand development, i.e. δK̄
t̂
> δt̂. If equity holders do not value future profits
highly enough, perfect collusion is impossible.
Imperfect Collusion
Any implicit agreement is stable if the resulting discounted profit stream is higher
than that from deviation. The incentive to participate in imperfect collusion is given
by (13). To maximize the profits from the implicit agreement, equity holders choose
the prices {pKt}
∞
t=0, where the gain from cheating is just offset by the additional pro-




is zero then. For a discount factor slightly below δK̄t , equity holders are forced to
reduce the potential gain from deviation to stabilize their implicit agreement. The-
refore, they set prices lower than those from perfect collusion in the most critical
period t∗: pKt∗ < p
K̄
t∗. As the pricing strategy is continuous in the discount factor,
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in a small interval below the critical lower bound for perfect collusion δK̄t , this price





For values of the discount factor in the range δ ∈ [δ̄t, δ
K̄
t ], the collusive price path
fulfills the chain of inequalities
pK̄1+kt̄ < ... < p
K̄
t̂+kt̄ > ... > p
K




(k+1)t̄, ∀ k ∈ N0. (16)
In all but the most critical period t∗, equity holders agree on perfect collusion. In the
interval [δ̄t, δ
K̄
t ), the price path exactly follows the demand development, although
perfect collusion is not stable over the whole cycle.
If the discount factor decreases further, firms are forced to reduce per-period profits
by lowering prices in an increasing number of periods. For a discount factor still
relatively close to δK̄ , price reductions are necessary only in periods of falling demand.
The price path is hence still procyclical but diverges from the demand pattern in
some periods. Note, however, that prices are lower for lower demand levels only in
periods where demand is falling, whereas prices exactly follow the demand pattern
for the same levels but rising demand. The pricing strategy here is only in some
respect contrary to the finding of anticyclical pricing by Rotemberg, Saloner (1986)
and Stenbacka (1994): In our model, firms’ reactions depend on the slope of demand,
whereas in their framework it is the level of demand that is decisive.
If the discount factor decreases even more, prices have to be cut in ever more periods,
i.e., not only in recessions but also in some periods with rising demand. Hence, pricing
is anticyclical in a growing part of the demand cycle. This part is larger the lower
the discount factor is. In the interval [δt, δ̄t), we observe the result of anticyclical
pricing derived by Rotemberg, Saloner (1986) for uncorrelated demand shocks even
in the case of cyclical demand development.
If the discount factor approaches the critical threshold for stable demand D(p, θt),









the collusive per-period profit πKt must be constant over the cycle. With the single
peaked demand development given by (8), firms can ensure this only if the collusive
price path {pKt}
∞
t=0 is anticyclical. This can be shown by contradiction: Equityhol-
ders cannot reduce per-period profits tacitly agreeing on a price above that resulting
with perfect collusion. Hence, if the price path is not strictly anticyclical and the dis-
count factor is close to δt, there is at least one period t
′, for which the per-period profit
from collusion is larger than that in other periods. We have πKt′ ≥ π
K
t , ∀ t = 1, ..., t̄
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and πKt′ > π
K
t for some t 6= t
′. Therefore,
V (t′, πK1 , ..., π
K
t̂
, ..., πKt̄ , δ) < V (t
′, πKt′ , ..., π
K
t′ , ..., π
K
t′ , δ), (18)
with the incentive to collude for period t′ on the left hand side of (18) and the
respective value for constant per-period profits πKt′ on the right hand side. This
condition is valid with strict inequality as V (·) increases in πKt . For δ → δt the





, δ) < 0
follows. If the per-period profits are not constant, and therefore the price path is
not exactly anticyclical, the collusive agreement is not stable for values of δ close to
δt. Due to the continuity of the profit stream in δ, prices are adjusted continuously.
If the discount factor increases above δt, the collusive price can be increased in one
of the periods. In the interval δ ∈ [δt, δ̃t), the price in this period will not yet be
higher than the prices in the neighboring periods. For such values of the discount











(k+1)t̄, ∀ k ∈ N0, (19)
in which the profit of one period is already larger than the remaining per-period
profits of the cycle. For discount factors higher than δ̃t, firms can reach an implicit
agreement with one or more prices violating the chain of inequalities (19).
Price Competition
From (13) and (17) it is clear that for values of the discount factor below δt, collusion
is impossible because the gain from deviation is larger than the gain from tacit
agreement even if collusive per-period profits are held constant over the cycle. For
values of the discount factor in [0, δt), equity holders cannot collude and set the
prices pBt . As the competitive price also depends on the demand level when the
good is differentiated, the price path is procyclical in the punishment phase. Only
the competitive (punishment) price for a homogeneous good pt = c is acyclic. These
results are summarized in figure 2.
Figure 2: Price Path in Dependence of the Discount Factor
PSfrag replacements





competition imperfect collusion perfect collusion
I II III IV
I : heterogeneous: strictly procyclical, homogeneous: acyclical pricing
II : strictly anticyclical pricing
III : mixed pricing
IV : strictly procyclical pricing
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As figure 1 shows, in a singly peaked cycle for every period after which demand rises
(e. g. t′), there is a period with the same level of demand after which demand falls
(e. g. t′′). Due to discounting, the profit stream from an implicit agreement is larger in
starting periods where demand is still rising. As the gain from deviation is the same
in both periods t′ and t′′, the period t∗ in which perfect collusion is impossible for the
first time because of a discount factor lower than the critical threshold for perfect
collusion, δK̄t must lie in the phase of falling demand. With cyclical fluctuations, the
critical phase for collusion is in a recession.
This result is contrary to the finding of
”
price wars during booms“ by Rotemberg,
Saloner (1986). The difference in the pricing behavior is due to the fact that the
agents in our model know the pattern of demand whereas in Rotemberg, Saloner
(1986) and Stenbacka (1994) the demand level develops stochastically. As shown
by Haltiwanger , Harrington (1991), with a repeated cyclical structure, the decision
about compliance with or deviation from tacit collusion does not depend on the
actual level of demand (as with stochastic shocks) but on its increase or decrease.
Our analysis shows that this is also true if firms are leveraged and products are
differentiated.
Case 2: Firms are Bankrupt in the Case of Punishment
If the periodic repayment b is higher than the per-period profit from price competition
at the peak of the cycle, b > πB
t̂
(pB), firms will go bankrupt if a deviation occurs.
This is also true if the good is homogeneous. Thus, the optimal pricing strategy
derived in this section also applies in the latter case.
Equityholders still decide whether to collude or deviate comparing the respective
profit streams. Analogously to (13), their inclination to collude is now given by
V b(t, πK1 , ..., π
K





Index b denotes cases where firms are bankrupt after a defection. Due to insolvency
in the punishment phase, repayments do not cancel. Comparison with the corres-
ponding incentive of firms that always solvent (13) shows the impact of leverage on
the intensity of competition. As by assumption the repayment exceeds the profits
from price competition even for the highest level of demand, the reduction of collu-
sive gains are higher in the case of bankruptcy. The inclination to participate in an
implicit agreement declines with rising indebtedness. This is true irrespective of the
value of the discount factor and hence regardless of the intensity of collusion. Thus,
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the critical thresholds of the discount factor are higher here compared to situations
where firms are always solvent.
In sum, the arguments given for situations where firms are never bankrupt continue
to hold qualitatively, but due to the lower additional stream of net profits from the
tacit agreement, all critical thresholds of the discount factor, for cyclical pricing as
well as for price competition, are lower if firms are insolvent after a breakdown of
collusion. The critical values given in figure 2 are shifted to the right by an increase
in the debt level.
Case 3: Firms are Bankrupted by Punishment Only if Demand
is Very Low
Again, an intermediate case is possible where firms are bankrupt only in periods of
low demand, i.e. if demand is lower than some critical level θ∗∗.13 If the implicit
agreement breaks down, equity holders gain per-period profits from price competition
as long as demand level is still higher than this critical value. If the demand falls
further, firms are insolvent and debtholders take over. The formal analysis is the same
as in the case of solvency considered in the first case, but the profit stream from the
punishment phase has to be replaced by the sum of discounted per-period profits
from the periods where firms are solvent and the stream of discounted repayments
due in all later periods.
As repayments are higher than per-period profits from price competition in per-
iods where firms are insolvent, the reduction of the future collusive profit stream is
now stronger than in the case of solvency, but less severe compared to a situation
where firms are bankrupt immediately after a defection. The effect of limited lia-
bility of equity holders is hence the same as in the case of uncorrelated stochastic
shocks. Consequently, the critical values of the discount factors separating the dif-
ferent pricing strategies are lower than in the case of bankruptcy immediately after
a breakdown of the collusive agreement, but higher than in situations where firms
are always solvent.
As in the case of uncorrelated demand shocks, the degree of product differentiation
is decisive for the solvency of firms in price competition. Given that firms are less
13 Here, cases 1 and 2 are again contained as special cases. Case 1 results, if the critical demand level
for solvency in price competition θ∗∗ is lower than the smallest value of the demand parameter
θ1, whereas case 2 results, if θ
∗∗ is larger than θ̂, the parameter value at the peak of the demand
cycle.
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likely to be bankrupt if goods are highly differentiated, the stability of collusion and
hence the critical values of the discount factor separating the intervals of pro- and
anticyclical pricing (cf. figure 2) are higher with a higher degree of heterogeneity.
Again, a greater degree of product differentiation can facilitate collusion if firms are
indebted.
The above analysis showed that the collusion is also destabilized by debt if demand
develops cyclically as long as firms face bankruptcy due to punishment at least for
low demand levels. Hence, the effect of leverage is qualitatively identical for all
demand patterns considered here. In markets with demand cycles, however, pricing
is anticyclical only if equity holders place a low value on future profits. If they
are more patient, procyclical pricing is optimal. Thus, the optimal collusive pricing
strategy of leveraged firms is qualitatively identical to the optimal price path derived
by Haltiwanger , Harrington (1991) for unleveraged firms producing a homogeneous
good. The cyclicity of pricing, however, is more pronounced the higher the debt
level.
5 Demand Cycles with Stochastic Shocks
Until now, we considered uncorrelated shocks and cyclical fluctuations separately.
Analysis of simultaneous cyclical and stochastic demand changes would necessitate a
great number of case differentiations in addition to those concerning the insolvency
of firms in price competition. Seeing as a unified framework is to complicated to
yield clear results, we will only briefly outline such a setup.
To this end, we model demand development as a sum of a trend and a stochastic
process as customary in time series analysis (see, e.g., Harvey 1993) and assume an
i.i.d. stochastic shock on the demand level of every period of the repeated cycle.
The level of demand for variety i in period t resulting from both the realization
of the stochastic shock and the cyclic trend gives an equity holder’s expectation of
the demand for his product. If the expected values of the demand levels in the
model with additional stochastic shocks are equal to the levels in the model with
deterministic cyclical development, it is sufficient to replace the per-period demand
in the above model by its expected value to account for the stochastic shocks. The
expected value of the profit stream is then also equal to the profit stream without
additional shocks. The current shock realization only changes the possible gain from
deviation. As in the model with purely stochastic shocks by Rotemberg, Saloner
(1986), equity holders have to react to the changing incentive to deviate by lowering
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the collusive price if the current demand realization is high. On the other hand, they
can tacitly agree on a higher price than without the additional shock if the actual
value of the shock is low. If the demand level results from a cyclical development with
stochastic shocks, the pricing decision is a combination of the strategy for cyclical
development of demand and the strategy for markets with uncorrelated stochastic
shocks. Therefore, the finding of less intense collusion between leveraged firms and
a more pronounced cyclicity of pricing remains unchanged in the model combining
both kinds of demand fluctuations. This again proves the robustness of Haltiwanger ,
Harrington’s (1991) conclusions with respect to leverage and product differentiation.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis determined the impact of outside finance on the pricing decisions of
firms in long run competition. Comparison with Wanzenried ’s (2003) results reveals
that leverage is advantageous in short-run price competition, but lowers firms profits
in long-run interaction, irrespective of the demand fluctuations. Debt is hence an
other example for the “ ‘topsy-turvy principle’ of supergame theory” (Shapiro 1989,
p. 365).
The effect of limited liability, i.e. bankruptcy and the resulting inability of equity
holders to repay debt, proves decisive for the effect of leverage on the competitive
pressure in infinitely repeated competition with stochastic demand shocks as well
as with cyclical demand development. The basic effect of limited liability derived
by Maksimovic (1988) also holds for price competition and is robust to demand
fluctuations: Equity holders running the firms decide on whether to adhere to or
defect from a tacit agreement comparing the profit streams resulting in both cases.
If firms are always solvent, repayments are due irrespective of whether equity holders
compete, collude or deviate. Hence, the debt level does not change their incentive to
collude. If, however, firms are insolvent in non-cooperative price competition, they
cannot meet the repayments in the punishment phase. In this case, obligations from
debt do not cancel in the comparison of profits from continued collusion against those
from defection and the ensuing punishment. Thus, the potential costs of cheating,
i.e. the forgone future profits from the tacit agreement, are lower the higher the
repayment is. Consequently, collusion is less stable the higher the leverage. The
degree of product differentiation is thus decisive for the effect of debt: If the good
is sufficiently differentiated, even profits from non-cooperative price competition are
sufficient to serve the liabilities. Then, firms are solvent even if they do not collude in
the product market. If the product is fairly homogeneous, however, non-cooperative
profits are insufficient to meet the financial obligations. Hence, debt reduces firms’
24
ability to collude only if the degree of product differentiation is not to high. The latter
effect was not considered in the earlier model of demand fluctuations by Stenbacka
(1994).
The development of demand, however, determines equity owners’ optimal collusive
pricing strategies. If market demand is subject to uncorrelated shocks, a high level
of current demand results in a high potential gain from defection, whereas the future
gain from continued collusion remains unchanged. Hence, if the demand realization
is higher than a certain critical level, equity holders are forced to reduce per-period
profits from deviation by lowering prices. These price reductions stabilize the implicit
agreement. As collusion is more difficult if debt levels are high, the critical demand
realization leading to such price reductions is lower the higher the leverage is. The
anticyclicity of prices increases with the firms’ indebtedness. The same reasoning
applies if market demand develops cyclically: In this case, the inclination to collude
depends on the slope and not on the level of demand. As the potential punishment
for defection is lower in times of falling demand, the incentive to cheat on the tacit
agreements is higher in such periods. If owners place sufficiently high value on future
profits, collusion has to be stabilized by lower prices only in periods of falling demand.
Pricing is then procyclical. Additional price reductions in periods preceding a fall
in demand are necessary only if owners do not place high value on future profits.
In this case, they set prices anticyclically. Again, the incentive to collude declines
with the debt level. Consequently, the cyclicity of pricing is more pronounced in
markets where firms are highly indebted. Thus, the basic insights by Rotemberg,
Saloner (1986) and Haltiwanger , Harrington (1991) continue to hold if products are
differentiated and firms are leveraged.
Irrespective of demand development, obligations from debt destabilize a potential
price-fixing conspiracy. Hence, high levels of debt, as needed for example to finance
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